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Background:  Children  are  scheduled  to receive  18–20  immunizations  before  their  18th  birthday  in England
and  Wales;  this  approximates  to 13 million  vaccines  administered  per  annum.  Each  immunization  rep-
resents  a potential  opportunity  for  immunization-related  error  and  effective  immunization  is  imperative
to  maintain  the  public  health  benefit  from  immunization.  Using  data  from  a national  reporting  system,
this  study  aimed  to  characterize  pediatric  immunization-related  safety  incident  reports  from  primary
care  in  England  and  Wales  between  2002  and  2013.
Methods:  A cross-sectional  mixed  methods  study  was  undertaken.  This  comprised  reading  the  free-text
of incident  reports  and  applying  codes  to describe  incident  type, potential  contributory  factors,  harm
severity,  and  incident  outcomes.  A  subsequent  thematic  analysis  was  undertaken  to  interpret  the most
commonly  occurring  codes,  such  as  those  describing  the  incident,  events  leading  up  to  it  and  reported
contributory  factors,  within  the  contexts  they  were  described.
Results:  We  identified  1745  reports  and  most  (n = 1077,  61.7%)  described  harm  outcomes  including  three
deaths,  67  reports  of  moderate  harm  and 1007  reports  of  low  harm.  Failure  of  timely  vaccination  was
the potential  cause  of  three  child  deaths  from  meningitis  and pneumonia,  and described  in a  further  113
reports.  Vaccine  administration  incidents  included  the  wrong  number  of  doses  (n = 476,  27.3%),  wrong
timing  (n = 294,  16.8%),  and wrong  vaccine  (n =  249,  14.3%).  Documentation  failures  were  frequently
implicated.  Socially  and  medically  vulnerable  children  were  commonly  described.
Conclusion:  This  is  the  largest  examination  of  reported  contributory  factors  for  immunization-related
patient  safety  incidents  in children.  Our findings  suggest  investments  in  IT  infrastructure  to support  data
linkage  and  identification  of risk  predictors,  development  of  consultation  models  that  promote  the  role
of  parents  in  mitigating  safety  incidents,  and  improvement  efforts  to  adapt  and  adopt  best  practices  from
elsewhere,  are needed  to  mitigate  future  immunization-related  patient  safety  incidents.  These  priorities
are  particularly  pressing  for vulnerable  patient  groups.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-NDAbbreviations: NRLS, National Reporting and Learning System; WHO, World Health O
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. Introduction
Each immunization represents a potential opportunity for
mmunization-related safety incidents, and given their prevalence
nd potential preventability the World Health Organization (WHO)
as recognized this as a priority area for healthcare improvement
1]. Without address, population-level protection could be compro-
ised, national campaign efforts to promote uptake hindered, and
he trust of patients and families reduced [1,2].
Reviews of patient medical records estimate 27–35% of immun-
zations involve an error [3–6]. Analysis of patient safety incident
eports, such those within the US MedMARx reporting system,
ave suggested additional doses, the wrong immunization, and the
rong dose given are the main types of errors involved [7]. Further,
urveillance systems collecting information about adverse drug
eactions, such as the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System,
ave also identified common sources of errors, but they primar-
ly focus and receive reports on the health problems, illnesses or
ymptoms experienced by patients following immunization [8,9].
espite those insights, analyses of such reports are often limited by
he lack of comprehensiveness of reports.
Whilst previous studies have classified immunization-related
afety incidents in terms of their type [7,9,10], few studies have
omprehensively explored the underlying factors contributing to
hem [3–5,7–11]. Incident reporting systems, like the England and
ales National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS)2, include a
ange of patient safety incident types, specifically descriptions of,
any untoward incident that may  or may  not have led to harm” and
nvite free text descriptions of what happened, perceived poten-
ial contributory factors and actions to prevent future occurrence.
xamination of report content can support the design of learning
nterventions to mitigate future events [12,13].
We aimed to characterize the nature and severity of
mmunization-related patient safety incidents involving children
n primary care in England and Wales, in order to: identify prior-
ty issues for improvement; and generate hypotheses about change
deas that could form the basis of improvement recommendations
nd interventions.
. Method
.1. National reporting and learning system
The NRLS2 is a national reporting system that collates locally
enerated reports that are received from healthcare organizations
hroughout England and Wales. The NRLS was launched in 2003
nd receives approximately 100,000 reports a month, the majority
ritten by healthcare professionals. It receives over 65,000 reports
er annum involving children [13]. Reporting patient safety inci-
ents that resulted in severe harm or death of a patient became
andatory in June 2010; however, before this all reporting was
oluntary, and reporting remains voluntary for incidents resulting
n no, low, or moderate harm [14,15].
Each report contains categorical information about location,
atient age, incident type, and reporter perception of harm sever-
ty – collected in a structured report form – as well as free-text
escriptions of the incident [14,15].
.2. Sample selection
Over 20,000 pediatric, primary care-related incidents are
resent in the NRLS. Immunization-related safety incidents
ere identified by free-text key term searches, which we  have
ound to generate both a sensitive and pragmatic means for
dentifying reports. Search terms and their permutations were(2015) 3873–3880
informed by brand and generic vaccine names from the British
National Formulary and by an analysis of a pilot sample of
over 600 immunization-related reports [10,16]. We  included any
immunization-related safety incidents occurring in primary care
involving a child aged under-18 years between 2002 and 2013.
2.3. Data coding
Incident report free text was  read and codes were applied
to describe incident type, potential contributory factors, harm
severity, and incident outcomes. The ‘Recursive Model of Incident
Analysis’ method was used as a set of rules for applying codes in a
chronological order (Supplement 1) [17]. This permitted modeling
of the sequence of events leading to the primary incident type that
resulted in the outcome experienced by the patient (Supplement
2). A ‘severity of harm’ had already been assigned to each report
by the reporter; based on our interpretation of the report content,
the severity of harm was  re-classified using definitions from the
WHO International Classification of Patient Safety when required
(Table 1) [18]. Generic and brand names of vaccines were recorded.
Incident types were independently double coded for a random 20%
sample of reports (PR and HPE) with 3rd person arbitration (ACS)
when necessary.
2.4. Data analysis
Relationships between codes were examined using frequency
distributions and cross-tabulations. Two-way cross-tabulations
were generated between age, incident type, vaccine type and con-
tributory factors, compared to harm. Associations between these
were examined using the Fisher’s exact test. To adjust for confound-
ing of vaccine type on the effect of incident type on harm severity,
a Mantel Haenszel adjusted approach was  taken by stratifying vac-
cine and incident type.
2.5. Thematic analysis
Reports that contained the most frequently occurring incident
type or contributory factor codes were re-read to generate addi-
tional insights and interpretations about those incidents and the
kind of contexts in which they occurred [12]. Qualitative data soft-
ware (NVIVO 9, QSR International) was used to independently
analyze the reports and create new codes to capture this infor-
mation. Themes that helped support our understanding of those
incidents, and why they might have occurred, were agreed between
PR and ACS [12,19].
2.6. Ethical approval
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board research risk review
committee waived the need for ethical review given the
anonymized nature of these data (ABHB R and D Ref number:
SA/410/13).
3. Results
3.1. Characteristics of reports
Free-text searches identified 2298 reports, of which 1745 were
included. Reports were excluded if they: were not immunization-
error related (n = 464), e.g. describing a child who  had received
appropriate immunizations; contained insufficient free text
(n = 24); or described issues that did not result in a patient safety
incident (n = 65). Reports were submitted from 254 NHS providers
in England and Wales, including 1052 reports from community
nursing and 596 reports from general practice settings. Cohen’s
P. Rees et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 3873–3880 3875
Table  1
The vaccines involved in reported incidents and the number of reports they are involved in (note: *2 vaccines were involved in 1 child’s death).
Vaccine No harm Low harm Moderate harm Death Frequency (%)
Measles Mumps  Rubella (MMR)  86 269 6 – 361 (18.2)
Pneumococcal conjugate (PCV) 140 160 4 3 307 (15.5)
Diphtheria tetanus acellular
pertussis/inactivated
polio/haemophilus influenza
type B (DTaP/IPV/Hib)
97 142 1 1 241 (12.1)
Meningitis C (Men C) 103 122 1 – 226 (11.4)
Haemophilus influenza
b/meningitis C (Hib/Men C)
70 123 2 – 195 (10)
Diphtheria tetanus acellular
pertussis/inactivated polio
(DTaP/IPV)
29 145 1 – 175 (9)
Human papilloma virus (HPV) 52 59 14 – 125 (6)
Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) 42 52 7 – 101 (5)
Tetanus, diphtheria and
inactivated polio (Td/IPV)
15 65 13 – 93 (5)
Haemophilus influenza b (Hib) 13 37 – – 50 (3)
Hepatitis B 24 10 7 – 41 (2)
Hepatitis A 10 11 0 – 21 (1)
Influenza 11 8 1 – 20 (1)
Other  6 9 1 – 16 (1)
Rotavirus 5 2 – – 7 (0)
Typhoid 2 4 – – 6 (0)
Total  705 1218 58 4* 1985 (100)
Definitions of Harm: No harm—patient outcome is not symptomatic and no treatment is require; Low harm—patient outcome is symptomatic, symptoms are mild, loss
of  function or harm is minimal and intermediate but short term, and no or minimal intervention is required; Moderate harm—patient outcome is symptomatic requiring
i  or los
i causin
o ent.
k
p
o
w
T
c
r
p
e
t
s
(
z
7
v
T
a
t
‘
t
p
r
3
t
y
M
a
H
(
t
ntervention, an increased length of stay, or causing permanent or long-term harm
ntervention or major surgical/medical intervention, shortening life expectancy or 
f  probabilities, death was  caused or brought forward in the short term by the incid
appa statistic of inter-rater (coding) reliability was  high, k = 0.77,
 < 0.001.
Most reports involved children aged less than three years
ld (n = 952, 55%) and peaks in frequency occurred, as expected,
ithin the age groups children receive most vaccinations.
ables 1 and 2 highlight the most commonly cited vac-
ines and their associated harm severity outcomes. Most
eports (n = 1135, 65%) described outcomes, which included:
atient inconvenience (n = 801, 45.9%) such as receiving unnec-
ssary treatment (n = 481, 27.6%) and requiring additional
reatment (n = 379, 21.7%); clinical patient harm (n = 205, 11.7%)
uch as injuries (n = 72, 4%); and exposing the patient to risk
n = 139, 8%), for example by leaving them vulnerable to immuni-
ation preventable diseases (n = 108, 6%).
Administration was the most frequent incident type (n = 1282,
3.5%), with ‘wrong number of doses’, ‘wrong timing’, and ‘wrong
accine’ described in (n = 1019, 79.5%) of those reports (Table 2).
hese are analyzed in further detail below.
There was a strong association between the type of
dministration-related incident and harm (p < 0.001) and the
ype of vaccine and harm (p < 0.001). After stratification into both
incident’ and ‘vaccine’ strata there was an association between
ype of administration incident and harm (in all vaccine strata
 < 0.001), thus vaccine type did not explain the varied risk of
eported harm.
.2. Administration of the wrong number of doses
Children who received the wrong number of doses were
ypically under six years old, most frequently (less than two
ears old n = 141, 30%), and typical vaccines implicated included
easles Mumps  Rubella (MMR)  (n = 156, 33%), Diphtheria Tetanuscellular Pertussis/Inactivated Polio (DTaP/IPV) (n = 87, 18%), and
aemophilus influenza b/Meningitis C (Hib/Men C) (n = 77, 16%)
Table 4). Reports frequently described harm (n = 448, 94.1%),
ypically because the child received unnecessary additionals of function; Severe harm—patient outcome is symptomatic, requiring life-saving
g major permanent or long term harm or loss of function; and, Death—on balance
vaccinations—a low harm event (Example 3.1, Table 3). One inci-
dent resulted in an adverse reaction necessitating a hospital
admission—a moderate harm. There was no evidence to suggest
association between vaccine type and harm (p = 0.49) within this
stratum (wrong number of doses).
Such incidents were frequently the result of prior incidents
involving documentation failures (n = 188, 40%), including docu-
mentation not being up to date (n = 128, 27%), available (n = 45,
9%), or accurate (n = 15, 3%) (Examples 3.1–3.3, Table 3; Supple-
ment 2). Additional associated incidents included administration
of the wrong vaccine (n = 49, 10%), communication failures (n = 26,
5%), and difficulties making appointments (n = 19, 4%).
Table 5 presents the contributory factors described. Patient
and parent contributory factors included: inadequate knowledge
(n = 40, 8%), for example not being aware of which vaccines were
needed or had previously been received; being new to the area or
family practice (n = 36, 8%); and eight incidents (2%) were partly
the result of a child being in ‘out-of-home’ care (e.g. foster care)
(Examples 3.2 and 3.3, Table 3). Staff factors included: not follow-
ing a protocol (n = 60, 13%), for example not checking the medical
records before administration; and mistakes (n = 67, 14%) such as
misreading vaccine names (n = 10, 2%).
3.3. Administration at the wrong time
Vaccines administered at the wrong time (n = 294, 16.8%) were
typically described as deviating from the recommended national
immunization schedule. Most children were aged under 1 year
old (n = 175, 60%). Vaccines typically involved were Pneumococcal
conjugate (PCV) (n = 91, 31%), Diphtheria Tetanus acellular Pertus-
sis/Inactivated Polio/Haemophilus influenza type B (DTaP/IPV/Hib)
(n = 83, 28%), and the MMR  (n = 48, 16%) (Table 4). There was no
evidence to suggest an association between vaccine type and harm
(p = 0.51) within this stratum (wrong time).
Of 55 (19%) harmful incidents, eight incidents resulted in mod-
erate harm—typically these reports described delayed prophylactic
3876 P. Rees et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 3873–3880
Table 2
The frequency and severity of harm described for each age group and for each primary incident type (N.B. this table does not include the frequencies of contributory incidents).
Severity of harm
No harm Low harm Moderate harm Death Frequency (%)
Age
Under 28 days 15 7 3 – 25 (1)
1  month to 1 year 307 246 13 3 569 (32.6)
2  to 4 years 206 433 9 – 648 (37.1)
5  to 11 years 41 133 5 – 179 (10)
12  to 17 years 99 188 37 – 324 (18.6)
Incident type
Vaccination
Administering 438 824 17 3 1282 (73.5)
Wrong number of doses 28 447 1 – 476
Wrong  timing 239 44 8 3 294
Wrong  vaccine 97 150 2 – 249
Not  administered 14 65 1 – 80
Wrong  dose 26 31 – – 57
Expired  vaccine 3 46 – – 49
Non-specific 10 13 – – 23
Contraindicated vaccine 14 5 1 – 20
Wrong  patient 2 14 – – 16
Wrong  site 1 2 3 – 6
Used needle 3 2 – – 5
Wrong storage – 4 – – 4
Wrong route 1 1 1 – 3
Adverse reaction – 103 43 – 146 (8)
Prescribing and dispensing 26 – – – 26 (1)
Reconstitution error – 4 – – 4 (0)
Batch recall 4 – – – 4 (0)
Insufficient supply 1 – – – 1 (0)
Non-specific 1 – – – 1 (0)
Documentation 97 5 1 – 103 (6)
Records not up to date 62 3 1 – 66
Records  inaccurate/unclear 29 2 – – 31
Record  availability 6 – – – 6
Administration 50 4 2 – 56 (3)
Appointment management 36 3 – – 39
Transfer  of information 12 1 2 – 15
Other  2 – – – 2
Procedural skills 4 53 – – 57 (3)
Communication 44 9 – – 53 (3)
With patients or parents 42 9 – – 51
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Other 3 5 
Total 668 1007 
dministration of Hepatitis B and Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG)
accines to high-risk newborns. Three other incidents of delayed
accination-contrary to the national recommended schedule-were
otentially implicated in child deaths from meningitis and pneu-
onia, (Example 3.4, Table 3). Reports describing low harm
utcomes typically described children who required additional vac-
inations for adequate immunity. Timing-related vaccine incidents
ere preceded by incidents involving: appointment management
n = 60, 20%), documentation failures (n = 31, 11%), communication
ailures (n = 21, 7%), transfer of documentation (n = 16, 5%), and
ther vaccine-related incidents such as administration of the wrong
accine (n = 12, 4%) (Supplement 2).
Table 5 highlights contributory factors implicated in these
ncidents such as: failure to follow protocol (n = 32, 11%); poor
ontinuity of care (n = 22, 7%), for example community nurses not
eceiving birth notifications from secondary care; and staff mis-
akes (n = 22, 7%) (Examples 3.4–3.7, Table 3).
.4. Administration of the wrong vaccine
Administration of the wrong vaccine was described in 249
eports (14.3%) and they were largely given to children under one
ear old (n = 121, 49%). Of these, 152 (61%) incidents resulted in
arm, typically because children received unnecessary vaccina-
ions and required additional treatment i.e. the vaccine that was– – 2
4 – 12 (1)
67 3 1745 (100)
originally required. For example reports described administration
of a Hib/Men C combination vaccine (n = 31, 12%) when a single
(non-combination) Meningococcal C (Men C) vaccine was sched-
uled. Men  C (n = 87, 35%), PCV (n = 85, 34%), and Hib/Men C (n = 61,
25%) vaccines were frequently implicated (Table 4). These inci-
dents were rarely preceded by other incidents; however 18 (7%)
resulted from documentation failures, and six (2%) resulted from
immunizing the wrong child (Example 3.8, Table 3; Supplement 2).
Within this stratum (wrong vaccine) there was strong evidence for
an association between vaccine type and harm (p < 0.001).
Contributory factors described were: staff issues which included
mistakes (n = 87, 35%) such as confusing vaccines with similar
names or appearances (n = 37, 15%) and failure to follow protocols
(n = 35, 14%), such as concurrently preparing vaccines for multiple
children (Example 3.9, Tables 3 and 5).
3.5. Overarching themes—Responsibility and vulnerability
Many reports implied parents were partly responsible for the
occurrence of incidents, for example if the parent did not bring
parent-held records to appointments or did not provide accurate
medical histories (Example 3.3, Table 3). An underlying expectation
that parents should be aware of their child’s immunization needs
and history was  apparent. However parents appeared to have sim-
ilar expectations of, and confidence that, healthcare professionals
P. Rees et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 3873–3880 3877
Table  3
Edited extracts from incident reports.
Wrong number of doses
Example 3.1: Patient presented with stepmother for pre-school booster. Written consent from father was brought but parental held record was not available.  Nurse
explained she was giving repevax and MMR. The following day stepmother called expressing concern that MMR  had already been given in 2004. Incomplete
documentation of initial dose of MMR  booster. (Low harm)
Example 3.2: Child placed with adoptive parents who were advised by Social Worker to attend physician to complete primary vaccinations. Attended surgery with parental
held  records but no family practice records were available. Only two immunizations were recorded in the parental held record. Immunization given with consent.
Later  informed by social services that child had already completed her primary immunizations. Family practice records checked and confirmed above. (Low harm)
Example 3.3: Patient received the third primary immunizations twice in error once in Ghana and once at the health center. Mother failed to notify the health visitor of the
first  immunization. (Low harm)
Wrong timing
Example 3.4: An infant died from a streptococcal pneumonia—which could have been prevented if the child had received childhood immunizations. The mother stated she
was  not aware that her child should be immunized and the child was not registered at a family practice until *** Identified areas of concern include: the management of
the  child immunization processes, family practice registration processes and notifying child health of non-registered patients. (Death)
Example 3.5: Patients mother rang after receiving birthday card for child and realizing that her daughter had not received an immunization appointment since
transferring into the area. Child health still had old address and old family practice details. Mother told to book immunization appointments with new family practice.
(No  harm)
Example 3.6: Patient’s relative contacted health visitors regarding her child’s immunizations, she reported she had not received any appointments for her child’s third
primary immunizations. Child health computer had recorded wrongly that the child had his third immunizations on the same day as he had his second immunizations.
The  patient received his third primary immunizations late because of this. Child health would not have been aware of this if the parent had not contacted the service.
(No  harm)
Example 3.7: Patient was scheduled for Hib/Men C vaccine, staff checked his immunization record and became aware that he already had this immunization. At this point I
made an error. I told the mother that we could give the MMR/Prevenar. Mother’s English is not perfect and she agreed. As I came to record the immunization, I realized
my  error there was a two-week gap between immunizations not 4. (No harm)
Wrong vaccine
Example 3.8: I was covering an immunizations session where normally there are 2 immunizers, the 2nd immunizer was sent home sick ten minutes prior to the start of the
session. The healthcare assistant went to get the child and the mother for the immunization. The wrong immunization was administered to the child as we had the
paperwork for a different child. The error was realized immediately, the child received Hib/Men C and MMR  instead of 5 in 1 and Men  C. (Low harm)
Example 3.9: Mother took her five-month-old baby to her family physician for his second DTaP/IPV/Hib vaccination. The staff nurse administered the wrong injection
because she did not consult his medical records. The baby was given an MMR vaccination that should not be given until he is 13 months old. Staff Nurse says she was
distracted during the appointment. The Nurse will re-train and demonstrate her competency through supervision. (Low harm)
Vulnerable child
Example 3.10: Baby received routine immunizations in baby clinic. The baby’s consultant had written to the family physician requesting that the baby not receive
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immunizations until he is one-year post chemotherapy. Mother believed baby 
of  chemotherapy previously. Family physician had seen this letter and had put a no
(No  harm)
hould be aware which immunizations their child required (Exam-
le 3.7, Table 3).
Collaboration between healthcare professionals and parents
as reported as preventing some near-miss immunization-related
afety incidents. There were reports detailing how parents had
itigated harm and prevented incidents by advocating for their
hildren, chasing appointments, informing staff when the wrong
accine was prepared, or reminding staff when a vaccine was con-
raindicated (Examples 3.5 and 3.6, Table 3). Lack of this parental
afety net could be a factor in the immunization-related incidents
escribed in children in ‘out-of-home’ care.
Socially vulnerable children such as those in ‘out-of-home’ care,
nd children of immigrant or traveller families, were described as
xperiencing incidents as a result of difficulty accessing care, poor
ontinuity of care, and documentation failures. Accessing appro-
riate care was difficult for those vulnerable children for a range
f reasons, including language barriers and inadequate parental
nowledge of the need for vaccination or how to access primary
are services, and in one case a child died (Example 3.4, Table 3).
able 4
he vaccines involved in the most frequently reported incident types and their frequencie
Vaccines
Type of administration incident MMR  PCV DTaP/
IPV/Hib
Men  C Hib/Men C DTaP/IPV
Wrong number of doses 156 75 63 49 77 87 
Wrong timing 48 91 83 37 29 7 
Wrong vaccine 41 85 56 87 61 49 
Not  administered 12 2 5 13 4 3 
Wrong dose 12 1 1 7 3 1 
Expired vaccine 12 – 1 2 4 7 
Contraindicated vaccine 2 1 – 1 – 2 
Wrong patient 7 1 4 2 1 1 
Other  2 5 2 3 4 1  have immunizations as he had received two flu vaccines between two sessions
aby record but the note was  not dated and believed to be an automatic warning.
Medically vulnerable children such as pregnant adolescents,
those at risk of TB, Hepatitis B or HIV, or immunocompromised
children, who  required additional vaccinations or had contraindi-
cations to certain vaccines, were commonly represented in these
reports. Numerous factors featured across those incident reports
including: communication failures with children and parents; non-
disclosure of medical conditions; non-adherence to the advice that
parents were given by pediatricians; and poor staff and parent
knowledge of vaccine contraindications in certain medical condi-
tions (Example 3.10, Table 3).
4. Discussion
This study has shown that the types of immunization-related
safety incidents experienced by children are consistent with stud-
ies undertaken in other countries. Safer immunization is a priority
area for quality improvement, which should focus on administering
the correct vaccine, the correct number of times, and at the correct
time for all children, and the timely and correct immunization of
s.
 HPV BCG Td/IPV Hib Hepatitis B Other Hepatitis A Influenza Total
8 20 36 16 – 5 3 1 596
16 14 2 2 21 6 1 – 357
8 3 23 1 1 5 6 4 430
1 6 1 28 1 – 1 – 77
2 9 – – 5 1 5 3 50
1 5 1 3 1 1 2 2 42
– 5 1 – – 2 – 2 16
2 – 1 – – – – – 19
2 5 – – 2 3 – 2 31
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Table 5
Frequency of described contributory factors (note: *some reports described more
than one type of mistake).
Frequency (%)
Patient/parent factors
Patient/parent behavior—the way in which
patients or parents act or conduct
themselves
74 (8)
Non-compliance 60
Non-disclosure 12
Other 1
Violence 1
Patient/parent geography—the area where
patients live
64 (7)
New to area 62
Access difficulties 2
Patient health—factors relating to the
patient’s physical and mental wellbeing
37 (4)
Allergy 22
Non-specific 4
Disability 4
Immunocompromised 3
Abnormal coagulation 2
Pregnancy 2
Patient/parent knowledge—insufficient
knowledge or inadequate application of
knowledge
48 (5)
Out-of-home care—children not in the care
of  their parents e.g. in foster care
18 (2)
Patient/parent language—patient or parent
unable to communicate in English
5 (1)
Staff factors
Mistake—cognitive lapses *240 (25.2)
Non-specific mistake 139
Similar vaccine appearances 45
Distraction 22
Misreading 18
Inattention 10
Similar patient names 9
Failure to follow protocol—not adhering to
organizational guidelines
186 (20)
Knowledge—insufficient knowledge or
inadequate application of knowledge
19 (2)
Fatigue/stress—extreme tiredness, mental or
emotional strain
5 (1)
Other factors 3 (0)
Equipment/vaccine factors
Failure of equipment/vaccine—the
equipment or vaccine is faulty
36 (4)
Equipment/vaccine packaging—he packaging
is impractical inadequate or faulty
25 (3)
Equipment/vaccine storage—inadequate
impractical storage
25 (3)
Poor equipment/vaccine design—the design
is  impractical, inadequate or faulty
3 (0)
Organizational factors
Working Conditions—factors relating to the
work environment
52 (5)
Continuity of care—issues with the
co-ordination of services
48 (5)
Education and training—insufficient
education and training of staff
36 (4)
m
c
s
e
4
f
d
Inadequate guidelines or protocols—existing
guidelines not fit for purpose
27 (3)
Total 951 (100)
edically and socially vulnerable children. Crosscutting reported
ontributory factors for quality improvement interventions include
taff mistakes, coordination and verification procedures, and par-
nts’ and staff knowledge and consequent behaviors.
.1. Strengths and limitationsThis is the largest examination of reported contributory factors
or immunization-related patient safety incidents in children. Inci-
ent report data are prone to numerous and well-acknowledged(2015) 3873–3880
biases including under-reporting and selective deposit bias [20].
For example, although the NRLS accepts reports from patients and
parents, such reports were not apparent in our dataset. Further,
there was  likely differential reporting between organizations, those
with good reporting cultures likely contribute more than those
without such cultures [21].
Methodological rigor was ensured by keeping an audit trail of all
coding-related decisions, holding weekly meetings to discuss anal-
ysis, and independent double-coding of 20% of reports indicating a
high degree of concordance [22]. Our findings are hypothesis gen-
erating, inductive in nature, and require testing and development
in further research and future clinical practice.
4.2. Reviewing these findings in the context of other literature
High numbers of reports describing administration of the wrong
number of doses was  expected because they are usually apparent
to those involved (the healthcare professional, patient or parent)
and thus more likely to be reported. Previous studies investigat-
ing immunization-related safety incidents mirror our findings and
demonstrate receipt of additional vaccines is a widespread prob-
lem often resulting from poor documentation e.g. where a child
is immunized but this goes undocumented resulting in that child
receiving that same vaccine later [4,7,23]. In one U.S. study, over
20% of children received unnecessary duplicate vaccinations [4].
Our data contained reports of delayed vaccination or receipt of
vaccines out-of-schedule with the national immunization sched-
ule. Experts determine the vaccination schedule to afford children
maximum protection from diseases and to minimize the risk of vac-
cine interaction. The consequences of deviating from this schedule
are unclear [7,24,25].
Wrong vaccine administration is a recognized issue [7,23,26,27].
Children who  receive the wrong vaccine, but in whom the error
goes undetected could be both under-protected and at risk since
their inadequate immunity would be unrecognized [7,23]. The
potentially severe consequences of immunization-related safety
incidents in medically vulnerable children have also been high-
lighted by other studies [28,29].
Socially vulnerable children were commonly represented in this
sample and the inverse care law, where those most in need of high
quality care are the least likely to receive it, is evident in this context
[30]. Poorer vaccination uptake in vulnerable children is described
in the literature [31–33], yet the challenges of conducting research
with marginalized populations could perhaps explain the limited
interventional efforts to date [34].
4.3. Recommendations for improvement
Continued efforts by manufacturers to create vaccines with dif-
ferent packaging and distinguishable names are needed [35,36].
Our findings support targeted community nurse visits to socially
vulnerable children [37], to educate parents about the need for
timely vaccination, and to encourage vaccine uptake. In addition,
providing parents with access to all of their children’s records could
reduce documentation discrepancies and appointment-related
incidents, as well as provide healthcare professionals with a safety
net [38]. This could also be enhanced with better accessibility of
unified immunization records for staff [39]. Building IT infrastruc-
ture and functionality capable of sharing data between health and
social care providers could support identification of predictors of
risk and inform interventions to mitigate future incidents [40].
Encouraging parental involvement, and creating a culture where
parents feel comfortable challenging healthcare professionals,
could also prevent safety incidents [38]. Co-production methods,
where patients and providers co-design new models and meth-
ods of care delivery could be used to inform local improvement
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nitiatives that advance this parent–provider relationship for child
afety [41–43]. Public health organizations and researchers must
eek to establish what methods of communication work best for
ifferent patient and parent groups, and embrace the challenge of
ndertaking research with and for marginalized patient popula-
ions.
To reduce staff mistakes, locally-owned efforts to adopt and
dapt best practices proven to be effective elsewhere should be
xplored for verification and standardized preparation of vaccines
36,44].
. Conclusions
The types of immunization-related safety incidents experi-
nced by children in England and Wales are consistent with
hose described in studies undertaken in other countries. This
s the largest examination of reported contributory factors for
mmunization-related patient safety incidents in children, and
ased on this analysis we have made a number of priority rec-
mmendations for policy, practice, and research. These include:
nvestments in IT infrastructure to support data linkage and the
dentification of risk predictors; development of consultation mod-
ls to enhance parental roles in mitigating safety incidents; and
mprovement efforts to adapt and adopt best practices from else-
here. These priorities are particularly pressing for medically and
ocially vulnerable patients.
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